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I.

INTRODUCTION

Suppose a young man of Middle Eastern descent is walking along a
public street on his way to work. Suddenly, a man with a camera steps in
front of him and takes his picture. The next day, this individual discovers
his picture on the cover of Time magazine above the headline "Outcast: The
Plight of Young Arab Males in Post-9/11 America," which is displayed on

* I am grateful to Greg Walter for insightful discussion on the topic of this article, and whose
contributions to this article are innumerable. Any errors or omissions, however, are entirely Greg's,
not mine.

newsstands across the country. Shocked and outraged, the young man calls
his attorney, whereupon the attorney informs him he has no cause of action.'
Consider also a newlywed couple honeymooning at a private resort.
The couple strolls onto an area in which, according to signs, "Topless
Sunbathing Is Permitted." With no one in sight, the woman removes her top
and begins to wade into the water. Unbeknownst to her, a photographer
lurks in the bushes one hundred yards away, and the zoom feature on his
camera is fully employed. Two months later, this woman discovers
photographic images of herself from that day on the cover of a guidebook to
nude beaches, which is distributed in bookstores throughout the nation. She,
too, discovers she has no cause of action.2
Finally, suppose that a group of friends, lost and in need of directions,
stop to ask a female police officer for assistance. Unbeknownst to them, the
police officer is in the midst of a photo shoot for Playboy magazine, and the
men are photographed conversing with the officer. Much to their chagrin,
this "action shot" is featured in the following month's issue as part of the
officer's nude pictorial. Just like the other plaintiffs, these individuals have
no right of privacy that can prevent publication of the photos.3
Each of these individuals has no cause of action because a plaintiff
cannot recover in tort for a breach of privacy for photographs taken of the
plaintiff in public places that bear a reasonable connection to the subject
matter of the articles they accompany.4 Thus, in the scenarios discussed
above, despite the fact that these individuals did not solicit the use of their
images and do not desire that their images be used, and despite the fact that
there is nothing particularly interesting or unique about these individuals
themselves, publishers have carte blanche freedom to exploit their images
for personal gain without being required to even ask for the subject's
permission to use these pictures.5
This article argues that this result is incorrect from the perspective of
social value. Aside from running counter to our preconceived notions of
right and wrong--our moral intuitions-a more expansive conception of
privacy rights actually maximizes economic value relative to the current
regime. Under existing privacy law, the photographers in the above

1. This hypothetical is based on Arrington v. New York Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1320
(N.Y. 1982).
2. This hypothetical is based on Creel v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 496 N.Y.S.2d 219, 219-20
(App. Div. 1985).
3. This hypothetical is based on Jackson v. Playboy Enters., 574 F. Supp. 10, 11 (S.D. Ohio
1983).
4. See, e.g., Arrington, 434 N.E.2d at 1320-24 (denying plaintiffs privacy tort claims because
his photograph was taken in public and had a reasonable connection to the magazine article it
illustrated).
5. See, e.g., id. (denying plaintiff's privacy tort claims even though his picture was not unique
and was published without his permission).
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hypotheticals own the rights to the photos they took. Accordingly, they have
no incentive to bargain with their subjects for the rights to the photographs,
and consequently, there exists no means of evaluating which party values
those rights more. By assigning the right to these photographs to the
individuals, however, we would allow the market to determine the party who
places greater value on the photographs, thereby maximizing economic
value.
As a general matter, the right of privacy is a state law tort remedy that
attempts to balance two opposing interests. On the one hand, it is generally
agreed that all individuals have parts of their lives that they should rightfully
be allowed to keep free from public view. On the other hand, there is
significant public value in the dissemination of information and the right to
free speech. The contours of existing privacy law 6 therefore represent an
effort by courts and commentators to define the proper balance between an
individual's right to be free from intrusion into his private matters and
society's right to obtain information about issues of public concern. Though
this somewhat ad hoc approach to legal development has produced a
reasonably effective body of law and provides a coherent starting point for
analyzing privacy issues, the lack of grounding in an overarching theory for
determining what information should be deemed "private" (and therefore
allocated to the individual) and what information should be deemed "public"
(and therefore allocated to society) leads to improper, inefficient results such
as those described above.
This paper explores why the young Arab gentleman, the topless
sunbather, and the lost friends described above should be protected under the
right to privacy tort. In Part II, I survey the law governing publication of
photographs and images within the context of the current four-pronged
formulation of the right to privacy.7 I then explain why and how the law
indeed fails to protect our unsuspecting "celebrities." 8 Part III argues that
these individuals should be protected by the law, not only because this result
seems intuitively correct but because this approach is value-maximizing.9 I
contrast the foregoing to a truly "newsworthy" situation--one in which there
is a valid and valuable public interest in the photograph's publication-

6. In this context, "existing law" primarily refers to the law in the states of California and New
York. The predominant role of these two states in defining the scope of privacy law should not be
surprising in light of the added importance that privacy law has for celebrities. Cases from other
states will be cited herein as appropriate.
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part 111.

where the law should allocate this right to the public.'

Furthermore, I

suggest a workable test that courts can use to determine whether a
photograph should be deemed newsworthy."1 Finally, the article addresses

the issue of where protection of this right should find its doctrinal home
within the current contours of the right of privacy tort, and concludes that
there are several viable possibilities.12
II.

A.

PROCEED WITH CAUTION: THE LIMITS OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY

The Evolution of the Right of Privacy

The right of privacy has been recognized in some form throughout
human history,' 3 and takes many forms. 14 Although attempting to canvass
the history of the law of privacy is beyond the scope of this article, it bears
noting that the right of personal privacy did not gain recognition as an
independent cause of action in tort until the 1890 publication of the seminal
article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. 5 Warren and Brandeis
compiled decisions in the areas of defamation, copyright, property, and
implied contract law, and concluded that the various decisions all stood for
an implicit recognition of a right to privacy, which they deemed the "right
'to be let alone."' "16 This right, Warren and Brandeis argued, should be
10. See infra Part III.B.
I. See infra Part III.B.2.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 276-82 (1981) (analyzing
the "theory of privacy" in an "economic model of privacy contained in comparative and
psychological studies"); DECKLE MCLEAN, PRIVACY AND ITS INVASION 1-4, 9 (1995)
("Anthropological and historical evidence ....is sufficient to indicate that a demand for various
kinds of privacy and an intuitive understanding of them are built into human beings.").
14. See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1340
(identifying "five dominant species of legal privacy... [tiort privacy... Fourth Amendment
privacy... First Amendment privacy... [flundamental-decision privacy... [and] [sltate
constitutional privacy").
15. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 197
(1890). For convenience, the right of personal privacy is referred to herein as the "right of privacy,"
as it is commonly referred to in the caselaw. To be technically precise, however, it should be noted
that the tort law of privacy also encompasses a right of commercial privacy, which includes
substantial protection of the confidentiality of creative ideas, and a limitation on eavesdropping to
obtain these facts. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 254. These issues implicate trade secrets law, a
branch of the tort law of unfair competition. Id.
16. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 195 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF TORTS, OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
Yet at least one commentator has argued that Warren and Brandeis never equated the right to privacy
with the right to be let alone. "[Tihe article implied that the right to privacy is a special case of the
latter." Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 437 n.48 (1980); cf
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 8-9 (2000)
(arguing that privacy helps to protect us from being "judged out of context," and from having only
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recognized as an independent tort, 7 and several years later it was explicitly
so recognized.' 8

When Warren and Brandeis published their article, they were reacting at
least in part to new technology.' 9

The development of new mechanical

devices "threaten[ed] to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in
the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops."' 2 °

Moreover, the

authors viewed the press as "overstepping
in every direction the obvious
21

bounds of propriety and of decency.",
Perhaps the "second great monument ' '22 in the development of privacy
law occurred after Dean William Prosser published a law review article in
1960.23 Prosser reviewed court decisions on privacy cases subsequent to the
publication of the Warren-Brandeis article and concluded that the law of
privacy actually consisted of four separate prongs, each of which was
regarded by courts as a separate tort.24 He described the four torts as
follows:

an isolated piece of information become our defining characteristic in the eyes of the world); see
also Alex Kozinski, Pull Down the Blinds, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., July 2, 2000, at 10; but cf Nw.
Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004) (recognizing a privacy interest independent
of anonymity).
17. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 195.
18. This was therefore a rare case where legal scholarship clearly and obviously directed the
development of the law.
19. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 195-96. Some commentators have suggested that
Warren was compelled to write this article because of the unwanted press coverage given to his
wife's social functions. See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, The Right ofPublicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 203, 206 (1954) (noting the rumor that Warren decided to write on the right of privacy in
response to several newspaper articles written about the activities of Warren and his wife).
20. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 195 (source of quotation omitted in original); see also
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Shattered Mirror: Identity, Authority, and Law, 58 WASH & LEE L.

REV. 23, 25 (2001) ("[Before 1890] [y]ou had to sit still to pose because cameras were slow on the
draw. Now, with fast cameras, it was possible for somebody to steal your image without your
permission-perhaps without your even knowing it." (citing Robert E. Mensel, "Kodakers Lying in
Wait": Amateur Photography and the Right to Privacy in New York, 1885-1915, 43 AM. Q. 24
(1991))).
21. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 196. The authors continue:
Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade,
which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the details
of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy
the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured
by intrusion upon the domestic circle.
Id.
22. Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law out of The Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability
for Intrusionsin Public Places, 73 N.C.L. REV. 989, 997 (1995).
23. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
24. Id. at 389.

315

1. Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye.
4. [Commercial]
25
name.

[a]ppropriation of the plaintiffs likeness or

This formulation of the four distinct privacy torts was ultimately
adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts,26 and "[c]ourts in at least
twenty-eight states have explicitly or implicitly accepted each of the four
torts .... 27 Collectively, these four torts do afford some measure of
protection to unwitting photographic subjects-but a surprisingly limited
measure. To understand their collective application is to expose the limits of
ownership rights in one's own image.
Though all states have adopted some version of the right to privacy
either as common law or by statute,28 the success rate of the tort is less than
stellar.29 One commentator has surmised that "a review of court decisions
involving privacy claims raises doubts as to whether there really is a tort
remedy for invasion of privacy. ' 30 Indeed, though technological advances
pose an increasing threat to privacy, the four prongs of the right of privacy
afford limited protection.

25. Id. These tort are hereinafter respectively referred to as intrusion, public disclosure of private
facts, false light, and appropriation.
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E (1977).
27. See McClurg, supra note 22, at 998 & nn.40-41 (noting this fact and citing to cases).
28. See Lori B. Andrews & Ami S. Jaeger, Confidentiality Of Genetic Information In The
Workplace, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 75, 80 n.27 (1991) (noting that "[a]s of 1981 the tort of invasion of
privacy had been rejected only in Rhode Island, Nebraska and Wisconsin," but that "all three of
these states now recognize it by statute.") (citations omitted).
29. See Gavison, supra note 16, at 457 (noting the "relative rarity of legal actions" brought under
the right to privacy); Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM.
L. REv. 1205, 1268 (1976) (noting the "extraordinary scarcity of cases in which liability has been
imposed on the media solely on the ground of an embarrassing disclosure").
30. McClurg, supra note 22, at 999.
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B.

The Four-ProngedRight ofPrivacy in Action

Let us now observe each of the four privacy torts in action, using the
facts of the case underlying our hypothetical about the young Arab man as
an illustration. 3 The hypothetical is based on Arrington v. New York Times
Co. 32 In Arrington, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the unauthorized
use of a photograph taken of the plaintiff without his knowledge, which
appeared on the front cover of the New York Times magazine in conjunction
with an article on the "Black Middle Class., 33 As will now be discussed,
none of the four branches of the right of privacy tort protect this individual.
1. Intrusion
The tort of intrusion occurs when a defendant intentionally pries or
intrudes upon a plaintiffs private affairs or seclusion in a manner
objectionable to a reasonable person.34 This tort punishes the actual act of
intruding-i.e., whether the individual later disseminates the information is
irrelevant under this tort. 35 The intrusion must be into a private place or
matter as to which a plaintiff would have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 36 Thus, under the facts of Arrington, an intrusion claim would fail
because the man was in public, and an individual in public has no reasonable
expectation of privacy.37
Since the cases discussed here involve
photography or videotaping in a public place, there is not even arguably an
intrusion in these cases.
2.

False Light Publicity

The tort of false light publicity occurs when a defendant publishes facts
about a plaintiff that place the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye, and
which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person in the same

31. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
32. 434N.E.2d 1319 (N.Y. 1982).
33. Id. at 1320.
34. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 at
854-55 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter "PROSSER ON TORTS"]. This is unlike public disclosure of private
facts and false light publicity, discussed below, where it is the dissemination of the information to
the public that is objectionable.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (1998) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977)) ("'[T]here is no liability for ....observing [a
person] or even taking his photograph while he is walking on the public highway ....
'").

circumstances.

38

A fact presents the plaintiff in a false light if it attributes to

him either views that he does not hold, or actions that he does not take.39
The United States Supreme Court has further held that where the published

matter is in the public interest, the plaintiff cannot recover unless it is
established that the defendant acted with actual malice.40
In Arrington, the plaintiffs false light claim failed because the article

was deemed to be of "public interest" (newsworthy) and a logical
"relationship" could be found between the article and photograph :f the

plaintiff.4' Even though the plaintiff did not personally participate in the
events described in the article, and even though the plaintiff strenuously
objected to the article's characterization, the court reasoned that the
plaintiff-based on his "good taste and attire"-actually was "a member of
'the black middle class,"' whether he knew it or not.

Thus, the Arrington

plaintiff was not presented in any false light.43
Similarly, if our young newlywed appears on the cover of a guidebook
to nude beaches, the rational connection test will likewise be satisfied,
because she was indeed skinny-dipping.4 4 Her appearance on a nude beach
bears a rational relationship to the subject of the work-a guidebook to nude
beaches.45

The only way that a photograph illustrating a newsworthy article could
be a violation of the false light branch is if the article and the photograph
bear no reasonable connection whatsoever.46

Thus, for example, if the

38. PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 34, § 117 at 863-64.
39. See id. Because this action involves an element of falsity, defamation may also lie on the
same set of facts that give rise to false light. See, e.g., Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d
1128, 1133 (7th Cit. 1985) (comparing and contrasting the two torts).
40. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (defining actual malice as "knowledge that
the statements are false or in reckless disregard of the truth."). Thus, where the public interest in the
information is not overriding, a false light action may be maintained without proof of actual malice.
If the plaintiff is a public figure, however, the Time v. Hill requirement of actual malice still holds.
See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); see also Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1137
(noting that "this little niche of the law of privacy is dominated by Larry Flynt's publications").
41. Arrington v. New York Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (N.Y. 1982).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1322-23.
44. See Creel v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 496 N.Y.S.2d 219, 220 (App. Div. 1985) (permitting a
publisher to print a nude photo of a couple because "the photograph was utilized to illustrate a guide
book which disseminated information concerning a matter of public interest.").
45. The young woman might likewise find her image all over the internet. She will have no right
of action against any internet company that uses her image so long as she appears as part of a story,
or even photographic montage, on nude beaches, skinny-dipping, or the like. Such use satisfies the
rational basis test.
46. See, e.g., Creel,496 N.Y.S.2d at 220 (quoting Dallesandro v. Holt & Co., 166 N.Y.S.2d 805,
806 (App. Div. 1957)) ("It is well-settled that '[a] picture illustrating an article on a matter of public
interest is not considered used for the purpose of trade or advertising within the prohibition of the
statute ... unless it has no real relationship to the article ... or unless the article is an advertisement
in disguise."').
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headline below the picture of the Arrington plaintiff had read "America's

Drug Culture," the plaintiff would likely have a cause of action under false
light since the headline wrongly-or at least unfairly-implied that the
plaintiff was himself a member of the drug culture.

Under this "rational relationship" or "reasonable connection" test, the
photograph itself need not contain any independently newsworthy content; it
must only bear a reasonable connection to a newsworthy article.48 While I
will discuss this test later-and ultimately conclude that it should be
abandoned-it is sufficient to note for now that this is the state of the law.

3. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
The tort of public disclosure of private facts occurs when a defendant
publicly discloses private information about a plaintiff that would be
objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, and the
information is not a matter of legitimate public concern.4 9 Liability may
attach under this privacy branch if the elements of a prima facie case are
satisfied even though the factual statement about the plaintiff is true.5 0

The young Arab and the newlywed skinny-dipper cannot bring a claim
for public disclosure because the fact that each plaintiff was in public when
photographed means the fact of their image-even a naked image-is by
definition not private."
4.

Appropriation

The tort of appropriation occurs when a defendant uses a plaintiffs
name or likeness without authorization and for the defendant's own

47. See, e.g., Peay v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948) (no reasonable
connection between face of an honest cab driver to illustrate a story about widespread cheating by
city taxi drivers); Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 39 So. 499, 500 (1905) (finding no reasonable connection
between inclusion of plaintiffs name and photograph in a "rogue's gallery" of convicted criminals
when plaintiff has not been convicted of any crime).
48. See, e.g., Creel, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 220 ("[T]he photograph was utilized to illustrate a guide
book which disseminated information concerning a matter of public interest . .
49. See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 34, § 117 at 856-57.
50. Id. at 856.
51. See, e.g., Creel, 496 N.Y.S. 2d at 220 (holding that a photo of a nude couple, when used to
illustrate a guide to nude beaches, was a "matter of some public interest"); but cf Daily Times
Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 477-78 (Ala. 1964) (holding that publication of an
embarrassing picture captured nothing of legitimate news value, and so was not a form of protected
speech).
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commercial or business purposes. 2 There are two independent theories of

recovery that underlie the appropriation tort.53 In the case of a celebrity, the

subject's likeness has commercial value, whereas a private plaintiffs does
not.5 4 Thus, a celebrity's damages will likely focus on the reasonable value

of the defendant's use, such that the defendant does not profit from the
unauthorized use. 55 A private plaintiff, by contrast, will typically seek
56
damages based on the emotional harm that use of his image has cost him.
The newsworthiness limitation applies to appropriation as well.57
Almost by definition, if the subject of an article is newsworthy, the article is
deemed to fall outside the reach of the appropriation tort-and thus with it,
any pictures that are reasonably connected to the article. 8 This is largely
due to the fact that publication in a newspaper or magazine-even though
sold "for a profit"-is not considered to be a commercial or business
purpose. '9 Thus, in Arrington, the plaintiff brought an appropriation claim,
but it was rejected because the primary purpose of the photograph was to
illustrate a newsworthy article, and was not for commercial purposes.6 °
As we have thus seen, although individuals are afforded some degree of
protection based on privacy rights while in public, the scope of this
protection is narrower than one might expect. With the present state of the
law set forth, this article now proceeds to argue that this result is
unacceptable. At the same time that the law largely refuses to recognize
public protection, voyeurism is becoming increasingly popular, and the tools
of the voyeur become more powerful every day. Indeed, if Warren and
Brandeis were concerned about the impact of technology on privacy in their
52. See PROSSER ON TORTS, supranote 34, § 117 at 851-52.
53. See generally Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light: Publicity Rights and the
Eclipse of the Tort of Appropriation of Identity, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 224 (1999)
(comparing "property" and "dignity" approaches to the tort of appropriation); Dora v. Frontline
Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 792 (1993) (recognizing that the two types of appropriation
include the right to publicity and that which "concerns one's own peace of mind").
54. See Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 134 (2d Cir. 1984).
55. See Dora, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2dat 792.
56. Id.
57. See Lee v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., No. CV96-7069SVW (JGX), 1997 WL 33384309, at *4
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 1997) (citing Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 349 (Ct. App.
1983)) ("[C]ourts have consistently found that the newsworthy use of names and photographs also
bars liability under common law appropriation.").
58. There are two possible ways of looking at this analytically, though the final result is
identical. The first is to say that anything that is newsworthy is by definition not "commercial."
See, e.g., Lerman, 745 F.2d at 130-31. The second-notably adopted by the courts of California-is
to define any newsworthy article as an exception to the appropriation tort, implying that it is possible
for an article to be commercial and still be newsworthy. See, e.g., Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342.
59. See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 34, § 117 at 853 (noting how publications are afforded
the constitutional protection of freedom of the press).
60. Arrington v. New York Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1320-23 (N.Y. 1982).
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time, one can only imagine what they would think of some of the tools
available to photographers and cameramen today. 6' An overall trend toward
decreased social civility has coupled with tremendously powerful
technology and cheap but effective mediums of distribution, all of which
have dramatically magnified the ability of persons to invade the privacy of
others.62
The time has come to rethink prevailing conceptions of the right to
privacy. As Part III now argues, an economic approach to the allocation of

61. See McClurg, supranote 22, at 1017-19. McClurg notes:
Warren and Brandeis did not specify the particular "mechanical devices" that concerned
them when they expressed their fear that "what is whispered in the closet shall be
proclaimed from the house-tops." Film and magnetic sound recording were not invented
until the twentieth century, and while "detective cameras" concealed in items such operaglasses, revolvers, and books were popular toys among the rich in the 1890s, they had
little practical use because of their poor quality.
Whatever snooping devices concerned Warren and Brandeis, it is safe to say they are to
modern surveillance technology what the slide rule is to the personal computer. Anyone
with the inclination to intrude upon the lives of others may choose from a frightening
array of surveillance devices: video cameras built into briefcases, tie-tacs, clocks, smoke
detectors, and ceiling sprinklers; microphones and transmitters that can "hear thru walls"
and at great distances, and that come concealed in everything from writing pens to
electrical outlets; telephone tapping devices; night vision scopes; electronic lock picks;
and even devices to track the movement of vehicles. For those uninitiated in surveillance
skills, helpful reference books are available. How to Get Anything on Anybody explores
topics such as "eleven devices for listening through walls," and "expert ways to secretly
bug any target."
Id. One commentator has suggested that Warren and Brandeis were wrong to implicitly attribute the
rise of curiosity about people's lives to the excesses of the press. In so doing, they committed the
economic fallacy of theorizing that "supply creates demand." POSNER, supranote 13, at 239 (further
noting that "[a] more persuasive explanation for the rise of the gossip column is the secular increase
in personal incomes.").
62. See Lance E. Rothenberg, Re-Thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and the
Failureof CriminalLaw To Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public Space, 49
AM. U.L. REV. 1127, 1128-30 (2000). Rothenberg notes:
In a society perpetually altered by human innovation, we are faced with the elementary
problem of keeping the law apace with technology. In particular, the explosion of video
surveillance and micro-camera technology has had a profound impact upon our concept
of privacy. As video surveillance equipment has become smaller, more portable, more
easily concealed, and more accessible to the general public, its pervasive application has
contributed to today's cultural fascination with voyeurism.
Throughout the country, newspaper headlines report unsavory stories of surreptitiously
concealed video cameras prying into bedrooms, bathrooms, locker rooms, changing
rooms, and tanning booths in prurient attempts to film unsuspecting victims while in
various states of undress.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Charisse Jones, Phones Make Your Bad Side Visible to World, USA
TODAY, Oct. 20, 2003, at 2A (reporting on the popularity of cell phones with the capability to
capture photographic images, and noting that "[t]he potential for unsuspecting people to be shown in
humiliating situations, with their images transmitted to millions, is especially unsettling.").

privacy rights suggests that the class of plaintiffs illustrated by the
introductory hypotheticals should be afforded protection from the intrusions
they encounter.
III.

AN ECONOMICS-BASED REFORMULATION OF THE RIGHT TO ONE'S
IMAGE

A. The InitialAllocation ofRights
To approach the question of how the right to an individual's image
should be assigned, the first question to ask is normative.63 What goal are
we seeking to accomplish? Because our aim is to approach this issue from
an economic perspective, our goal is accordingly one of value: what rule will
64
maximize the odds that the right at issue will be put to its most valued use?
What rule can best insure that the person who values the right the most will
end up with it? In this context, we have only two options: either the
individual owns the right, or the right belongs to the public. If the individual
(for example, our newlywed skinny-dipper) owns the right to her image, any
photographer who sought to use the photo would have to bargain for its use
with her. In the event of any unauthorized publication, she would be legally
entitled to demand that her picture be removed from the cover of the
guidebook to nude beaches, and might further be able to demand
compensation for any guidebooks already distributed to the public.65 On the
other hand, if the right is allocated to the public (as it is presently),66 our
skinny-dipper would have no recourse to halt production of the guidebooks
or to demand compensation for the use of her image. Our goal is to
determine which starting point maximizes social value.
First, let us examine what will happen if the individual owns the right.
From the photographer's perspective, he is seeking a picture of a nude bather
for his book. If the goal is therefore to find a nude bather-i.e., some nude
bather-then the costs to bargaining are not prohibitive. The photographer
in this situation has enough time to approach the woman and seek her
consent, or to offer her payment for her consent; there is even time to sign a
contract. If that woman refuses, the photographer may seek out the

63. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 49 ("Normative economics holds that an action is to be judged
by its effect in promoting the social welfare .... ).
64. See generally id. at 60-87 (explaining the "wealth maximization" principle wherein "[t]he
most important thing to bear in mind about the concept of value is that it is based on what people are
willing to pay for something.").
65. PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 34, § 117 at 854 (noting that "[o]nce protected by the law"
an individual can capitalize on his or her right of value by selling licenses or by enjoining "the use of
the name or likewise by a third person.").
66. See, e.g., Playboy v. Jackson Enters., 574 F. Supp 10, 11-12 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
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permission of another nude bather. Alternatively, he may decide he would
rather not invest the time and effort to purchase the right, and so he might
hire a model or actor to pose for the guidebook's cover.
If the woman refuses a cash payment of, say, $500 for the right to her
image, she necessarily values that right by more than $500. She has,
therefore, effectively purchased this right for the opportunity cost of not
selling the right for $500. Similarly, if the photographer is unwilling to pay
more than $500 for the image, then he obviously values the fight by no more
than $500. And if the woman ultimately offers to sell her right for $1000
and the photographer agrees, another mutually beneficial agreement is
struck: the woman obviously values her right by less than $1000 since she
was willing to accept the payment, and she is therefore better off after the
deal. Similarly, the photographer is better off since the photograph, by
implication, is worth more to him than $1000. Thus, by assigning the right
to the subject of the photograph herself, the photograph is put to its most
valued use, and will ultimately be purchased by the person who values the
right the most. And that may well be the subject herself.
The same holds true in the hypothetical involving the young Arab man
photographed on the street who winds up on the cover of Time Magazine.67
As in our previous example, assigning the individual the right to his image
maximizes social utility. Every bit like putting the newlywed on the cover
of a guide-book to nude beaches, there is no reason why the individual on
the cover of Time must be this man, or why he must be photographed at this
instant, given the context in which the photograph will ultimately be used.
If the young man owns the right to his image, he can sell it to the
photographer only if he values the payment offered more than retaining the
right.
The same holds true for the lost group of friends who end up in the
middle of a Playboy shoot.68 If these individuals own the right to their
images, then they can bargain with the photographer.
Perhaps the
photographer genuinely values their images, in which case he will pay for
them. Or perhaps the men will sell their images for pennies (or nothing) for
the opportunity to appear in a popular men's magazine. On the other hand,
perhaps the men collectively ascribe more value to not appearing in Playboy
than the photographer does in using the picture, in which case the men will

67. See supranote I and accompanying text.
68. See supranote 3 and accompanying text.
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retain the right to not appear in the magazine.69 We do not, at least ex ante,
know who will end up with the right. What we do know is that when the
bargaining stops, the party or parties who value the right the most will end

up with it-and from society's perspective, that is a good thing.
Now let us consider what happens if we allocate the right to the public
domain. Suppose the same photographer takes the same picture of the
woman on the nude beach. Suppose further that the photographer, an astute

businessman, decides to bargain with the woman since, he figures, she might
be willing to buy the right to the image. If the value (to her) of the nonproduction of the photographs exceeds $500, she might enter into an
agreement to pay the photographer $500 for the rights to this and any other
photographs that this photographer may take. However, suppose the same

woman continues her sunbathing, taking comfort in the notion that her
image will not be appearing on the cover of any nude beach guidebooks. A
second photographer, having seen the handsome payment provided to the

first photographer, snaps a similar picture, figuring that now he can sell it to
the guidebook publisher. The woman, in order to keep her image private,
needs to bargain with this individual as well. And the same for the third
photographer, and the fourth ....
Clearly, as a practical matter if not a

theoretical one, value-maximizing bargaining or negotiations
will not take
70

place when the right is assigned to the public domain.
We quickly see that assigning the right to the public domain causes a
serious problem. Although the woman values the right to her image more

than the photographers, assigning the right to the public results in the strong
possibility of that image being put to a lower-valued use than if we had
assigned the right to the woman in the first place.
At this point, it may be tempting to think that this calculus is somewhat
incomplete because we are not taking the "public good value" of the pictures

69. We can imagine a slightly more complicated scenario, where three individual men ascribe
different values to their images-say, men one and two value their images at $200, man three values
his image at $500 (for an aggregate value of $900), and the photographer values the image at $1100.
In this case, though a cash payment of $1000 divided evenly ($333.33 per person) would not satisfy
man three, men one and two would be wise to give up a share of their payment (say $100 each) such
that each individual is better off. The first two men get $233.33, the third man gets $533.33, and the
photographer gets the rights to the photograph for $1000. All are better off.
70. Moreover, photographers should be cautious about approaching their subjects in an attempt
to negotiate the rights to the photos in circumstances such as these. For example, Cameron Diaz
recently made headlines when a photographer who apparently took topless photos of Diaz before she
became famous was arrested for extortion when he apparently offered Diaz the chance to "buy back"
the photos. See Julie Hilden, Does a Photographer'sAttempt to Sell Cameron Diaz's Topless
Photos Back
to
Her
Constitute
Extortion?, FINDLAW,
July
22,
2003,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20030722.html.
Although that situation also involved the
possibility that the photographer had forged Diaz's signature on a waiver, id., the photographer's
attempts to communicate with Diaz are not unlike our hypothetical bargaining between the topless
newlywed and the photographer.

[Vol. 33: 311, 2006]

Privacy Through Anonymity
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

into account. This is entirely the point: in each of the cases discussed above,
there is absolutely nothing genuinely unique or noteworthy about the
individuals or events photographed. Time magazine could just as easily use
a picture of another young Arab man, and the guidebook to nude beaches
could just as easily feature another nude sunbather (or perhaps a hired
model) without any meaningful loss of value to the end product. There is
absolutely no public good value to factor into the analysis. The entire
analysis is between the subject and the photographer. In each of these cases,
we see that the law's allocation of these rights to the public domain can lead
to highly inefficient results.
To further illustrate the point (and show its limitations), let us now
contrast the foregoing examples with situations properly deemed by privacy
law to be newsworthy.
B.

The Defense of Newsworthiness

In the hypotheticals discussed above, assigning the right in the image to
the individual-and thereby affording the individual a cause of action if that
right is violated-maximizes economic value by ensuring that, when
bargaining ceases, the person who values the right most will end up with the
right.7 None of the foregoing, however, is meant to or should apply to what
the law traditionally refers to as a truly newsworthy situation.
In
newsworthy situations, the people and events being photographed have
public-good aspects to their
publication that are absent from the
72
hypotheticals discussed earlier.
In economic terms, a newsworthy situation has additional, independent
value to the public that changes the calculus described above, which we
analyzed in the context of a non-newsworthy photograph. These public
good aspects make it appropriate to assign the photographic rights to a
newsworthy situation or image to the public domain rather than to the
individual. If we were merely to consider the interests of the photographer
and the photograph's subject in a newsworthy situation, we would be
missing an essential element of the calculation and might improperly assign
the right to the individual. If the individual is given the right, she might
decide not to allow publication, in which case the photograph is not put to its
most valuable use.
Put another way, the First Amendment-based
71. See supra Part III.A.
72. See, e.g., Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing and Publ'g, 727 N.E.2d 549 (N.Y. 2000)
(denying plaintiff's right to privacy claims because the photograph in question illustrated an article
on a matter of public interest.).
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newsworthiness doctrine is economically correct-at least when correctly
applied.
For example, suppose that our beach-going topless sunbather had
instead opted to sunbathe topless in front of city hall. Without question, this
event would be newsworthy. After all, it is not every day that an individual
appears naked in front of a city's most prominent building, much less sitting
down and relaxing for an afternoon tanning session. Or perhaps there are
political implications or themes motivating the act. In such cases, there are
public good aspects to the dissemination of the picture (and its
accompanying story) that are simply not present in the case of a reclusive
sunbather unknowingly photographed for the cover of a guidebook to nude
beaches. Thus, even if there is no impediment to bargaining-i.e., even if
the topless woman in front of city hall was perfectly approachable and
amenable to bargaining-the right should be assigned to the public domain
because the story and photo are themselves newsworthy.
In other words, if the woman was initially allocated the right to the
photograph, and if she refused consent to relinquish the right for valuable
consideration, she would have purchased the right to the photo for whatever
amount the photographer was willing to pay her for it. But unlike the
earlier, non-newsworthy examples, it would not follow that the right had
been put to its optimum use. Because the collective circumstances in the
city hall example combine to make the incident a newsworthy occurrence,
there are public good aspects to the photo itself that add value to its
publication. The photograph must be of this woman, at this point in time,
because it was this woman who sunbathed topless in front of city hall, and a
story about a woman sunbathing nude in front of city hall is clearly a matter
of public interest. Or to put the point in the language of the "reasonable
connection" test, the photograph does not just bear a reasonable connection
to a newsworthy story; the story is newsworthy only because of the events
captured in the photograph.
By contrast, while there may be public good aspects to the publication
of a guidebook on nude beaches, this is irrelevant to the question of whether
choosing this particular photographic subject to adorn the cover is a
necessary corollary to the article's newsworthiness. It is not. And because
the transaction costs to approaching the woman at the beach are not
prohibitive, assigning the right to her maximizes net economic value.
Accordingly, in such non-newsworthy situations, broadening the scope of
the right to privacy to the point where individuals such as these hypothetical
plaintiffs are afforded causes of action is a net improvement in societal
value.
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1. Re-examining the "Reasonable Connection" Test
The above analysis suggests that the newsworthiness exception to the
right of privacy is economically sound, at least as a theoretical matter.
However, for this analysis to retain its usefulness, courts must be careful to
avoid an over-inclusive application of newsworthiness.7 3 If the analysis is
expanded to include photographs that contain no independent public good
value, then the "economic soundness" of the doctrine is lost. That is, the
newsworthiness exception is economically reasonable only insofar as it
protects photographs and information that actually contain some
ascertainable public good value.
The exception thus ceases being
economically reasonable at exactly the point where there is no public good
value.
This is exactly what happens when courts hold that a photograph is
newsworthy simply if it has a reasonable connection or rational relationship
to an otherwise newsworthy article. In such a case, by definition, a court is
taking a photographic image that is clearly not newsworthy7 4 and giving it
First Amendment protection based on having some connection with an
article that does have public good value. Once we take this step, however,
the economic soundness of the newsworthiness doctrine collapses. We are
taking a photograph that has absolutely no independent utility-a
photograph that could be replaced within the newsworthy article by many
other photographs with no loss of value to the public-and we are allowing
any use connected with an article in the public interest. This approach is
economically unsound and requires reconsideration.
A line of cases out of New York state court further illustrate this point.
75
In Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing and Publishing,
the New York
Court of Appeals considered the claims of a plaintiff whose photograph was
used to illustrate an article in YM magazine that included the quotation "I
Got Trashed and Had Sex With Three Guys. 76 The article began with a
letter from a reader explaining that she became drunk at a party and engaged77
in group sex, and contained three full-color photographs of the plaintiff.
The court first noted the rule that when a photograph illustrates an article on

73. Of course, an under-inclusive application would be equally harmful.
74. We know it is not newsworthy because if it were, we would not need to say that it bears a
reasonable connection to something newsworthy. The picture or image itself would be newsworthy,
and would not need a reasonable connection to pass muster.
75. 727 N.E.2d 549 (N.Y.2000).

76. Id. at 550.
77. Id.

a matter of public interest, the newsworthiness exception bars recovery
unless there is "no real relationship between the photograph and the article
or the article is an advertisement in disguise., 78 Because the plaintiff here
was a model of the age described by the article, the relationship between
photo and article was strong enough to deny the plaintiff's claims.79
Likewise, in Finger v. Omni PublicationsInternational," the defendant
used a picture of a husband and wife and their six children to illustrate an
article on caffeine-aided in vitro fertilization.81 The plaintiffs sued, arguing
that none of their children were conceived through in vitro fertilization and
that they did not participate in the fertility project. 82 While conceding the
false impression conveyed by use of the photograph, the court nevertheless
held that the article was newsworthy and that given the fact that the plaintiff
did have six children, there was a real relationship between the photograph
and the article itself.83
Let's look at the photographs from Finger and Messenger in economic
terms. The articles at work in these two cases were deemed newsworthy-a
conclusion that is not disputed.84 However, when we look at the particular
photographs illustrating these articles from an economic perspective, we see
that there is absolutely nothing about using these particular photographs that
adds any value at all. The fact that the publishers chose these particular
individuals, to accompany the articles as opposed to any number of other
individuals, adds absolutely nothing to the calculation of value. The articles

78. Id. at 553.
79. Id. at 550, 554.
80. 566 N.E.2d 141 (1990).
81. Id. at 142.
82. Id. at 144.
83. Id. As noted previously, this was substantially the same analysis put forth by the Arrington
court. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
84. Finger, 566 N.E.2d at 144; Messenger, 727 N.E.2d at 555. This raises an interesting
discussion of the nature of newsworthiness, which is somewhat beyond the scope of this article.
Courts and commentators have consistently struggled with deciding whether the proper scope of
newsworthiness is based on "descriptive" newsworthiness-i.e., what the public actually finds
interesting-as opposed to "normative" newsworthiness-i.e., what should be valid fodder for
public consumption. See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W. Prods., 955 P.2d 469, 481 (Cal. 1998)
Messenger is a perfect example of this tension. Messenger, 727 N.E.2d at 552-53. While most
would agree that sex with multiple partners is rightfully a private subject, most would also agree that
it is curiosity-provoking on some level.
For several examples of pro-descriptive arguments, see Lee v. Penthouse International,Ltd.,
No. CV96-7069SVW, 1997 WL 33384309 (C.D. Cal. March 19, 1997); Clay Calvert, The
Voyeurism Value in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 273 (1999).

For several examples of pro-normative arguments, see Michaels v. Internet Entertainment
Group, 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 840 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Geoff Dendy, The Newsworthiness Defense to the
Public Disclosure Tort, 85 KY. L.J. 147, 160 (1997); Gary Williams, "On the QT and Very Hush
Hush ": A Proposalto Extend California'sConstitutional Right to Privacy to ProtectPublic Figures
from Publication of Confidential Personal Information, 19 LOy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 337, 345-46
(1999).
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in Finger and Messenger could just as easily have been illustrated by a
picture of another family and another woman, respectively-ones who
consented to, or were paid for, the rights to the photos-with absolutely no
loss of value to the public.
Furthermore, in addition to adding nothing of value, the use of these
particular photographs may come at a significant cost to the photograph's
subject. At a minimum, the woman in Messenger will likely be subject to
personal ridicule. If her family is informed of the photograph, it might cause
them significant embarrassment and might strain familial relations. If her
employers or coworkers find out about the photograph, she may incur
significant professional consequences.
Now, let us contrast Finger and Messenger with a situation in which the
newsworthy doctrine is applied properly. Consider Murray v. New York
Magazine Co.85 There, the plaintiff was a spectator at a St. Patrick's Day
parade in New York City. 86 Dressed in "Irish garb," his photograph was
taken without his knowledge and published on the front cover of a magazine
to illustrate a story on contemporary Irish-Americans in New York City.87
The court upheld use of the photograph on the grounds that the plaintiff
"voluntarily became part of the spectacle," and was permissibly "singled out
and photographed because his presence constitute[ed] a visual participation
in a public event which invited special attention."88
Though subtle, the distinctions between Murray, on the one hand, and
Finger and Messenger, on the other, are enormous. In Murray, the court's
analysis was at least implicitly underpinned by the fact that the subject of the
photograph was chosen for the photo precisely because of his participation
in an event which, given the circumstances, was itself newsworthy. 89 That is
to say, the photograph was newsworthy in its own right. Thus, and quite
sensibly, the photograph was then deemed to be a matter of public interest,
and the plaintiff's claims failed.90 By contrast, the Finger and Messenger
courts used the "reasonable connection" test as a bridge to connect a
concededly newsworthy article to a non-newsworthy picture.9' And in those
two cases, because the transaction costs did not prohibit bargaining for the

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
Omni

267 N.E.2d 256 (1971).
Id. at 257.
Id.
Id. at 258.
Id.
Id.
Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing Publ'g, 727 N.E.2d, 549, 553-54 (N.Y. 2000); Finger v.
Publ'ns Int'l, 566 N.E.2d 141, 144 (1990).
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rights

to photograph

those

particular

individuals

to

illustrate

the

accompanying stories (and by hypothesis, because the pictures did not
possess "independent" aspects of newsworthiness), assigning the rights to

the images to the plaintiffs would have maximized value.
And thus, a rule emerges: whether a picture should be deemed to be
newsworthy should be determined, not by mere reference to whether the
accompanying article or book is newsworthy, and whether there is a
"reasonable connection" between the article and the photo, but rather by
reference to whether the picture itself is newsworthy. If it is, then the right

to the photo belongs in the public domain. If the picture is not newsworthy
on its face, and the subject of the photo was chosen merely to illustrate the
article, then (whether there is a reasonable connection between the article
and the photograph's subject or not) the right should belong to the

individual. Why should the law care? Because this more expansive version
of privacy rights maximizes economic value. If the photograph does not
possess independent value as a newsworthy photo (which would change the

calculation), then assigning the right to the individual will ensure that, when
the bargaining stops, the right will have been purchased by the person who

values it the most and that the right will therefore be put to its optimum use.
This is an end the law should care about.
In addition, this rule squares with our moral intuitions. Just because the
public interest exception limits the privacy of public figures and those
directly involved with newsworthy stories, it should not follow that all

individuals with even a conceivable connection (no matter how attenuated)
to any aspect of a newsworthy story (no matter how minor) should be fair
game for publicity.9

92. Cf Gill v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 239 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1952) (holding in a California Supreme
Court case that husband and wife plaintiffs had a cognizable privacy claim where plaintiffs were
photographed in public while seated in an affectionate pose, and where the photograph was used to
illustrate an article in Ladies Home Journal entitled "Love"). Gill is an interesting case that was
perhaps ahead of its time. The court there was on the verge of accepting the theory of
newsworthiness endorsed by this article, noting that "the public interest did not require the use of
any particular person's likeness nor that of plaintiffs without their consent." Id. at 634. But the
court ultimately upheld the cause of action in deference to an entirely separate finding: the
photographs of the plaintiffs were used to illustrate an article with negative connotations and, on this
ground, a cause of action for false light could be found. See id. at 635-36. While this may be the
correct conclusion-and while the opinion may afford more protection than the Finger and
Messenger holdings-it does not go far enough. Under the theory set forth herein, aside from
whether the article had negative connotations, the threshold issue is whether use of the particular
photo is newsworthy in and of itself and if the transaction costs prohibit value-maximizing
bargaining. See also M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504 (Ct. App. 2001) (plaintiffs
prevailed on false light claim over use of their picture to illustrate an article about the coach of their
baseball team, who was arrested for child molestation).
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2. The First Amendment
Some will complain that the problem with this conception of
newsworthiness is that it will have an undesirable chilling effect on the
press. 93 This is the classic First Amendment argument-and, given the
prominent status that the First Amendment has in American jurisprudence,
one that must be treated with great seriousness. The argument in this
context is that the press will be less likely to publish even newsworthy
material under a more restrictive rule because it will be unclear which
photographs may be published.94 However, if one accepts the value
calculations above, they should not reject this theory on chilling effect
grounds.
First, since the primary cause of the supposed chilling effect is
indeterminacy, we can limit the chilling effect by providing a workable rule.
The rule, simply stated, is this: does the photograph, in and of itself, contain
distinctive elements of newsworthiness?
Stated more simply, is the
photograph itself newsworthy? Is there anything about the photograph that
gives it public-good value? If the photograph does contain distinctive
elements of newsworthiness, then it receives First Amendment protection.
Or, as with the hypothetical plaintiffs discussed in the introduction, does the
photograph depict an otherwise private (anonymous) individual not
connected to a newsworthy event except through his or her inclusion in a
highly non-distinctive class of individuals? Could many other individuals
easily be substituted for this individual without any meaningful loss of value
to the article? If so, the picture is not newsworthy.
Note that this rule is significantly more determinate than the reasonable
connection test.95 With reasonable connection, one must first determine
whether the article itself is newsworthy under existing law, then determine
whether the connection of the photograph to the article is sufficiently

93. See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 362 (1983).
When we weigh the continued chilling effect of potential litigation and unpredictable
liability against the benefits of allowing courts to retain the option of remedying some
rare, genuinely offensive bits of publicity, we must question whether the preservation of
even a small comer of the [right to privacy] tort is worth the risks. This observer answers
in the negative.
Id.
94. See Joseph Elford, Note, Trafficking in Stolen Information: A "Hierarchy of Rights"
Approach to the Private Facts Tort, 105 YALE L.J. 727, 735 (1995) (explaining that the ad hoc
nature of a newsworthiness inquiry leads to uncertainty on the part of publishers as to what exactly
they may publish).
95. For a discussion on the reasonable connection test, see supra Part III.B.1.
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"reasonable"--whatever that may mean in this context 9 6-to expand the
article's newsworthy protection to the photograph.97 With the test proposed
here, one must only determine whether the photograph itself contains
distinctive elements of newsworthiness. This more determinate test reduces
the chilling effect.
Still, critics may object (and this author admits) that this test is not
entirely determinate. For example, in many cases it will not be entirely clear
whether a photograph has no public-good value or whether there is some
limited value that constitutes legitimate newsworthiness. While these cases
will require a fact-specific analysis, and while this indeterminacy is certainly
undesirable, the relevant question is which alternative results in less
All things being equal, a test with one degree of
indeterminacy.
indeterminacy is preferable to a test with two degrees.
Moreover, close cases should be resolved in favor of First Amendment
protection out of deference to constitutional rights. The rule of the First
Amendment in this area is not absolute, however, and must be balanced with
individual privacy rights. 98 As one court has noted, "First Amendment
rights and privacy rights must be balanced and the outcome of a case
ultimately depends upon its own specific facts." 99 Furthermore, the fact that
there are close cases does not change the fact that there are very clear cases,
such as those discussed above, which are being unjustly treated now.
Indeed, the harm to privacy interests under the reasonable connection
test far outweighs the First Amendment benefit. As noted above, the First
Amendment concerns are small in this context due to the absolute lack of
uniqueness or added value associated with these particular photographic
images. '°° On the other hand, the cost to individual privacy in terms of loss
of anonymity is large, since all individuals that venture beyond the privacy
of their own homes are susceptible to becoming a public spectacle in spite of
having no legitimate association with a noteworthy event of any kind.

96. What it means, of course (at least in this context), is that there is likely to be no consistency
or predictability between jurisdictions or even within a jurisdiction.
97. See supra Part Il.B..1.
98. Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 198 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1425
(1988).
99. Id.
100. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.

332

[Vol. 33: 311, 2006]

Privacy Through Anonymity
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the crucial step in rethinking this branch of privacy law is
recognizing that extending the contours of the right of privacy tort is
economically sound. I have argued that a sound conception of the right of
privacy, when combined with a more reasonable view of newsworthiness,
will result in allocating the right to one's image to a class of individuals that
includes the hypothetical plaintiffs referenced throughout this article.
Ultimately, practical application of this approach will require finding a
doctrinal home. For example, a method by which to grant individuals the
rights to their images in the scenarios outlined above could be addressed by
an expansion of the appropriation tort, because it is already premised on
ownership rights and applicable to private individuals just as much as public
figures' 0 1-at least in theory.' °2 One might also imagine an extension of the
tort of public disclosure of private facts to cover a limited subset of nonnewsworthy public situations such as those in the introductory
hypotheticals.1 °3 This would require courts to take the step of holding that
matters which occur or may be observed in public can still potentially be
private-and thus covered by public disclosure of private facts. 10 4 Or
finally, by either abandoning or reworking the notion of non-newsworthy
photographs needing only a reasonable connection to a newsworthy article
to be fair game for publication, the false light tort may apply. 0 5
We might also go even further, and contemplate a more fundamental
reformulation of the right of privacy tort. Although this would seem a bit
drastic in most situations, a number of judges and commentators have
10 6
already noted the problematic nature of the current right of privacy tort.
While this is to be expected given the ad hoc nature of the law's
development in this area, it should not be considered acceptable.
How a court or legislature might doctrinally accomplish this is an issue
perhaps best left for another day, as the ultimate approach a court should
take is less important than simply recognizing that the economics-based
approach advocated herein is superior to the ad hoc approach that the law

101. For a discussion of appropriation, see supraPart II.B.4.
102. This is true at least as a doctrinal matter. Yet in practice, the tort of appropriation mostly
ends up applying to public figures.
103. See supra Part I.
104. For a discussion of public disclosure of private facts, see supra Part II.B.3.
105. For a discussion on false light, see supra Part II.B.2.
106. See, e.g., Elford, supra note 94, at 727.

has taken to this point. If there is a sense of urgency to this call to action, it
is the enormous gulf between popular conceptions or intuitions about the
right to privacy and the protection actually afforded by law' 07-- particularly
given the powerful tools readily available to the voyeur. Now is the time to
act.

107. McClurg, supra note 22, at 994. McClurg notes:
There are some indications that privacy law may be poised for a change as plaintiffs'
attorneys become cognizant of the gap between existing law and the public's perception
of what constitutes reasonable expectations of privacy. For instance, a spate of recent
lawsuits based upon intrusive videotaping has been filed against producers of tabloid
television shows. However, while plaintiffs have obtained favorable rulings in a few
cases where the videotaping occurred inside private residences, the "no privacy in public"
rule continues to be a roadblock for plaintiffs whose privacy is invaded in a public place.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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